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Brains for Capital.
The E⁄ect of Brain Drain on Investments and
Convergence





The empirical experience of countries hit by brain drain shows no clear impact
of human capital out￿ ow on the source economy. This study shows that by trig-
gering the capital ￿ ows from abroad, the brain can be bene￿cial for the sending
countries. The theoretical claim about the causal e⁄ect of brain drain on capital
￿ ows is supported by empirical analysis.
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1 Introduction
The problem of brain drain, which is the migration of well educated workers from poor
countries to wealthy countries, is widely observed across the world. Easterly (2001)
estimated that around 70 % of graduates in Guyana migrate to the United States.
Carrington and Detragiache (1998) showed that over a half of secondary and tertiary
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graduates migrate to the US from such countries as The Gambia, Fiji, El Salvador,
Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. On the other hand, today￿ s media announce that
growing number of researchers in developed countries have completed their education
abroad. According to the US National Science Board, among the US science and engi-
neering workers with master￿ s and Ph.D. degrees, 29 and 38 percent respectively were
born abroad1.
Brain drain was perceived as an explanation of income di⁄erences between countries.
The empirical e⁄ect of brain drain on the destination economies is clearly positive in the
long run (see North, 1974; Borjas, 1990 and 1995). The main ￿nding is that the in￿ ux
of high-skilled individuals boosts the hosting economy in the long run. The theoretical
explanation stressed the human capital as the key ingredient in the production and
R&D formation, through which the destination country bene￿ts from the brain drain.
An application on similar mechanism on the sending country should consequently lead
to a conclusion about the harming e⁄ect of brain drain. Several theoretical studies
highlighted the negative e⁄ects of human capital out￿ ow on source economies (Bhagwati
and Hamada, 1974; Kwok and Leyland, 1982; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Miyagiwa,
1991). The predictions of harming e⁄ect of brain drain on sending economies were not
con￿rmed by the newest empirical studies on the out￿ ow of human capital from the
developing countries, however. The empirical studies by Carrington and Detragiache
(1998) showed that the rate of brain drain for many poor countries is surprisingly low.
For example, less than one percent of the graduates in Senegal, Bangladesh, Benin,
Mali, Paraguay and Togo decides for emigration. Another observation is that some
sending countries are relatively wealthy as compared to their neighbors, which report
a small rate of emigration of highly educated individuals. For example, Taiwan and
South Korea observe relatively high rates of brain drain as compared to Bangladesh and
Indonesia, while the GDP per capita in these sending countries is much higher than in
their non-sending neighbors. Some sending countries indeed report higher per capita
income than the non-sending ones, nevertheless, there are also sending countries that
stagnate or do not di⁄er signi￿cantly from their non-sending neighbors. This suggests
that regarding the sending countries there is no clear relationship between the rate of
brain drain and per capita income.
To explain the empirical puzzle on ambiguous e⁄ects of brain drain on sending coun-
tries several theories that highlighted the positive e⁄ects of the brain drain on sending
countries have been presented in the literature. The positive impact of a brain drain
1Report of US National Science Board, Nov. 19, 20033
could arise when individuals invest in human capital aiming at perspective migration,
whereas the migration itself remains uncertain. In such a framework a certain fraction of
skilled agents remains in the sending country having a positive impact on its economic
performance (see Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001; Mountford, 1997). Although
this claim seems credible with respect to the East - Asian Tigers, it does not explain
the poverty of such sending countries as Guyana, The Gambia or El Salvador.
This paper provides an additional insight in associating the importance of investments
related to migration in understanding the total e⁄ects of brain drain on the sending
economies. I concentrate on the relation brain drain - investments - technological con-
vergence - as the channel that helps the sending countries.
Financial ￿ ows from migrants￿destination countries to their home countries could in-
dicate the positive e⁄ect of brain drain on the sending economies. In 2002 alone the
remittances amounted to $80 billion (Kapur and McHale, 2004). Consequently, capital
in￿ ows and trade are closely associated with the growing convergence of the technology
of the source countries. This is because the foreign investment and imported goods
embody the well developed technologies that become easier to acquire in the hosting
country. As the empirical studies of Edmonton (2001) and Lichtenberg and de la Potterie
(2002) reported, those of the developing countries that tend to trade with the developed
ones or receive capital in￿ ows from them tend also to acquire more technology from
abroad. Hence, if highly educated emigrants (the majority of legal migrants) trigger the
investment ￿ ows to their home countries, this should result in the technological catching
up of these countries.
To present the relation brain drain - investments - technological convergence I create a
simple theoretical model. Additionally I perform a simple empirical test to how whether
brain drain could cause investments ￿ ows from migrants￿destination economy to their
home country. I select this particular part of the model to be tested because other
theoretical predictions of the model are supported by empirical literature.
In my model, homogenous labor is used together with non rivalrous technology and
physical capital as a factor in the production sector, whereas the stock of knowledge
increases through the externalities that result from accumulation of human capital and
technology. The positive externalities in the creation of new ideas translate in the long
run onto international di⁄erences in wages.
I study and examine an example with imperfect labor markets (as in Pissarides, 1990;
Acemoglu, 1997) that results in complementarity between human and physical capital
in the process of production. The destination country reports higher stocks of physical4
and human capital. As a result, it becomes technologically advanced as compared
to the source country. Source country lags behind the frontier and relies on copying
of the outdated technology. Technological lag translates onto wage di⁄erences that
generate migration incentives for the skilled individuals. Emigration of the high-skilled
individuals results in further slowdown of technological adoption. On the other hand,
as the wages are smaller in the sending country, the entrepreneurs from the destination
country have incentives to invest abroad rather than in the destination country. Through
the intensi￿ed capital ￿ ows the modern technologies ￿ ow to the sending country so that
it indirectly bene￿ts from migration.
The existing empirical literature con￿rms most of the model￿ s predictions. Di⁄erences
in income trigger migration and the destination countries tend to screen migrants with
respect to their ability. The bene￿cial e⁄ect of investments on ideas has also support
in the empirical studies. The only hypothesis that has been not yet con￿rm is about
the causality of brain drain on investments. In this study I make a preliminary tests to
verify this hypothesis. Taking the data of Canadian brain drain to the US I ￿nd that it
indeed causes US investments to Canada.
To summarize, I show that:
￿ the brain drain has an unambiguously positive long-run e⁄ect on the destination
economy, whereas its short-run impact is negative for some groups.
￿ there are two opposite forces that determine types of e⁄ects of brain drain on the
source economy. One are the negative e⁄ects of the diminishing capabilities of
adoption due to lack of human capital. The second one is the growing volume of
capital transfer from the wealthy country to the lagging one that results in the
reduction of technological lag.
Thus, this paper shows that the unambiguously positive e⁄ect of the brain drain can be
observed only in the destination country. The e⁄ect on the sending country is a summary
of two opposite types of e⁄ects and thus the ￿nal impact is ambiguous. In addition,
this framework helps in understanding why skilled labor has incentives to move from
the poor country to the wealthy countries and why this phenomenon does not disturb
growth miracles, as observed in the Asian Countries.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a theoretical model;
initially as a general bench mark case that is next used to illustrate the migration
incentives and to study potential consequences of brain drain on both: sending and5
destination economies. Section three presents the simple empirical test of causal e⁄ect
of brain drain on FDI. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
This section introduces a simple model of an economy that is used in order to explain
how di⁄erences in fundamentals can translate into the di⁄erences in the economic per-
formance.
Consider the world that consists out of a mass of countries. In each country there are two
types of agents: producers (capital owners) and workers. Additionally, some countries
are also endowed with human capital. Particularly, suppose that countries di⁄er only
with respect to the distribution of physical and human capital. Besides, it is possible
that some countries do not have human capital at all. The existence of human capital
and its distribution in a country is known only to agents in this country.
Each economy is populated with agents that live for one period. In each economy, there
is a unit mass of ￿rms. For given country l, each ￿rm i is endowed with technology
Alt and with given volume of capital kilt: Thus, total capital stock in l is
R
kiltdi = Klt:
For simplicity assume that capital is uniformly distributed across ￿rms in given country.
Hence, each ￿rm in l is endowed with klt amounts of capital units and Klt = kilt
In each country l, human capital (denoted by j) is distributed on an interval [0;1]. This
can be interpreted as skilled agents that di⁄er with respect to their skills. Skilled agents
are endowed ex-ante with human capital hjlt: Human capital in country l is distributed
according the distribution Hl(j) with the convention that higher j corresponds to higher
levels of human capital.
In each country, ￿rms employ human capital together with physical capital and country-








where hjlt(i) is the volume of human capital employed by the company i and Lint is the
labor input in production that I henceforth normalize to unity.
Following Pissarides (1990) and Acemoglu (1996) imperfect labor market is assumed.
The imperfections related to the matching process result in ￿xed wage contracts. Par-
ticularly, according to a contract a fraction of output ￿yilt is taken by employers and
the rest (1 ￿ ￿)yilt is paid to the human capital.6
When no migration is possible, all ￿rms are symmetric. Therefore the expected wage
paid to a representative worker in country l is:
















Technological progress occurs as an externality in the process of production. At the
end of each period, the aggregated technology employed in production in given country
becomes the public knowledge. Such technology is then used as production input in the
next period. Similarly to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), the progress of technology
is easier, when given country lags far behind the technological frontier. The easiness
of the process of technological progress also depends on the stock of human capital in
given economy and other policy variables as intellectual property rights or taxation (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Barro, 2000 and Howitt, 2000 for further discussion). For
simplicity, in this study, the di¢ culty of technological progress is assumed to depend
only on the distance to the frontier and on the stock of human capital in given economy.
Particularly:
Ant+1 = Ant [1 + ￿ (A
max
t =Ant)Hnt] (4)












and in given lagging economy l:
Alt+1 ￿ Alt
Alt















One of conclusions that come from the model presented above are the wage di⁄erences
across the world. By equation (2) these di⁄erences emerge as a consequence in primary
inputs accumulation (human or physical capital).
Consider two countries S (source) and D (destination) that di⁄er with respect to their
initial endowment of human capital2. Formally, this implies that for any j hD(j) < hS(j):
Besides, assume that kS ￿ kD.
Migration Incentives
Recall the wages paid to human capital in both countries as introduced by (2):












Since for any j in D and in S; hD(j) < hS(j) it holds that HS < HD: Together with










Therefore EfwStg < EfwNtg: This implies that some high-skilled agents (human capital)
from S have incentives to migrate to D.
Consequences for the Destination Economy
Suppose that fraction m < 1 of high- skilled agents from S are allowed to enter the
destination economy. For simplicity assume there is no screening, so that the distribution
of human capital among the migrants is identical as in the source economy.
The e⁄ects of such migration for ￿rms in the destination economy are always positive.
Human capital (hence, the one o⁄ered by immigrants as well) is complementary to the
physical capital owned by entrepreneurs. Hence more skilled immigrants translate onto
higher output in D and more pro￿ts for the ￿rm owners. This means that entrepreneurs
of the destination country are in favour of brain drain.
Other than entrepreneurs, native skilled workers of D will not bene￿t from brain drain to
their country. Facing the fraction of m immigrants arriving to the destination country,
2For notational convenience time subscript is omitted where it does not cause any confusion.8





D (HD + mHS)
￿￿ [￿HS(m + 1) + HD ￿ HS]
(1 + m)2 < 0
Hence, skilled workers in D (through the labor unions) will opt for reduction of immi-
gration. The balance of in￿ uence powers of these two groups will result in immigration
policy of the destination country.
The brain drain has also some e⁄ect on the rate of technological progress of the destina-





= ￿ (HD + mHS)t (8)
That is larger than the rate of technological growth without the in￿ ux of skilled workers
(5). A proposition follows:
Proposition 1 An in￿ux of high-skilled individuals to given country in the short run
increases the income of ￿rm owners in this country and reduces the wages paid to native
skilled workers. In the long run, the brain drain increases the rate of technological
progress in the destination economy.
Consequences for the Source Economy
Out￿ ow of Human Capital If S looses a fraction m of its human capital it certainly
has negative consequences for technological growth of this economy. The new stock of
















Incoming FDI Once migration of high- skilled workers form country S to country
D occurs, employers from D know that S has certain stock of human capital that is
complementary to their physical capital. Moreover, they also know that since the wage
di⁄erence is large enough to attract migrants, either the technological gap distance is9
high, or the physical capital in S is scarce. In both cases entrepreneurs from D have
incentives to invest in S.
Suppose that at period t￿1, the brain drain from S to D signalled that S has a certain
stock of human capital. For clarity of the analysis assume that in period t there is no
migration form S to D. Suppose that a ￿rm from D that considers investment in S
instead of in D: Denote by n 2 (0;1) the fraction of ￿rms from D that invest their
capital stocks (i.e. kD per ￿rm) in S3. Say that n ￿rms enter local market of the source
country and make the wage o⁄er to its native skilled agents. Two main types of wage
o⁄ers could be considered:
￿ Foreign investors o⁄er same wage as local ￿rms in S. Such "pooling" wage o⁄er
translates onto larger share of pro￿ts for foreign investors, but does not allow them
for selection of high-skilled agents.
￿ Foreign investors o⁄er higher wage than local ￿rms in S. Such "separating" wage
o⁄er allows for selection of high- skilled agents, but could translate onto smaller
share of pro￿ts earned by investors.
"Pooling" Wage Contracts Since there will be less capital in D, the volume of
human capital per unit of physical capital in the destination economy will increase.
Thus, the pro￿ts from investments in D for those ￿rms that do no invest abroad are:
￿it = ￿ADtk
￿
D (1=(1 ￿ n)HD)
1￿￿ (11)
If given ￿rm from D invests abroad its capital stock kD it can o⁄ers the wages present
at the local market, i.e.:




This implies a higher fraction of pro￿ts taken by the foreign investor. Denote by ￿
0 the
contract that the investor o⁄ers on the market in S:
(1 ￿ ￿)AStk
￿
S (1=(1 + n)HS)
1￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿
0)ADtk
￿
D (1=(1 + n)HS)
1￿￿
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Thus the pro￿ts of a foreign investor in S become:
￿it =
￿









D (1=(1 + n)HS)
1￿￿ (13)
3Alternatively let n be the fraction of capital stocks form D invested in S.10
Without any intervention of the regulator, the volume of ￿rms that decides for investing
abroad is established by the no - arbitrage conditions between home and foreign invest-
ments presented by (11) and (13). The regulator of D might intervene, however, as the
wages paid to human capital in D decrease with the volume of foreign direct investments
n.
"Separating" Wage Contracts An alternative strategy that could be implemented
by foreign investors in S is to attract the most skilled workers by o⁄ering higher wages
that the local ￿rms do. Say that ￿rms from D o⁄er same wages as local ￿rms plus ",
where " is the arbitrarily small number. Say that as a consequence of such contract agent



































Clearly, the location of the indi⁄erent agent (and the volume of workers employed by
local companies) depends now on the o⁄er made: z(￿"). Concluding, the o⁄er made on
the market by foreign investors (￿"), particularly with respect to local o⁄er (￿) depends
on:
￿ technological distance (greater lag translates onto higher di⁄erence in wages)
￿ defence in capital stocks (larger di⁄erences in capital imply larger wage di⁄erences)
￿ skewness of the distribution of human capital (the more skewed the distribution,
the easier it is to attract the best agents, since the remaining part will not be able
to generate comparable income).












and the volume of ￿rms that decide for investing abroad is established (without any
intervention of the regulator in D) by the no - arbitrage conditions: (11) and (14).11
Technical progress in the source country If a fraction n of companies from D
invests in S, this will have certainly an e⁄ect on technological progress of the lagging
country. Assume that D is the frontier country. Then, the growth of technology as
reported at t could be disintegrated into two factors: the direct import of advanced
technologies and the technological progress achieved through production.
The direct technological progress occurs when a fraction n of D￿ s ￿rms invests abroad.
Particularly if n companies invested in S, then ASt = nAmax
t +(1￿n)ASt = [n=a + (1 ￿ n)]ASt
The "standard" technological progress is observed then in the process of production
according to:
ASt+1 = ASt [n=a + (1 ￿ n)][1 + ￿ [n + (1 ￿ n)a]HSt] (15)
Note that without migration the stock of technology reported at t + 1 would be:
ASt+1 = ASt [1 + ￿aHSt]
since [n=a + (1 ￿ n)] > 1, this is always greater than the growth rate that would occur
without the FDI (15).
Thus if brain drain works as an incentive for investment, a country can actually bene￿t
from it in therms of faster technological adoption. A proposition follows:
Proposition 2 The brain drain has two opposite e⁄ects on technological progress of
the source country: The negative e⁄ect is through the reduction of stock of human capi-
tal. The positive e⁄ect is through the direct technological transfer of investors from the
destination country.
3 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model presented in the previous section implies that several relationships
should be observed in the real world. First, the di⁄erences in real income per capita
should translate onto migration incentives and migration patterns. Second, skilled mi-
gration should be preferred to unskilled migration by the authorities of the destination
countries. Third, brain drain from one country to another should cause the investment
￿ ow in the opposite direction. Last, foreign investments should improve the stock of
knowledge of given country.
Most of these phenomena are con￿rmed by empirical literature. Numerous studies have
con￿rmed the di⁄erences in real income per capita cause migrations (see Hatton and12
Williamson, 2006, for an overview). Concerning the structure of migrants with respect
to their educational background, the empirical results show that well educated agents
dominate in the group of immigrants to the well-developed countries (Carrington and
Detrangiache, 1998). This is not surprising bearing in mind that many of developed
countries indicates educations as one of the key factors that facilitate the immigration.
(e.g. Australia, Canada, United States).
Regarding the e⁄ect of foreign investment on international transfer of technologies and
￿ several theoretical studies (e.g. Mattoo, Olarreaga and Saggi, 2004) suggest and
empirical studies (e.g. Blomstr￿m and Kokko, 1997) con￿rm the strong and positive
dependence between the volume of foreign investments (particularly form technologically
advanced countries) and the growth of TFP in the country where the investment took
place. This is not a surprise, since foreign direct investments also result in the transfer
of methods of management, organization and know ￿how used in further production.
To complete the empirical analysis, I need to verify whether brain drain could trigger
investments to the source country of migrants to from their destination country. I stress
that my main concern is to check whether such dependence can be observed. A more
detailed characterization of such dependence as well as description of its scale I leave
for the further research.
I perform the analysis of causal e⁄ects of brain drain on investments on the example of
the United States and Canada. I take this two countries because of the availability of
data on both US foreign direct investments in Canada, and Canadian brain drain to the
US. It will also allow me to avoid the problem of di⁄erent measurement methods and
potential heterogeneity of the sample. The data comes from Statistics Canada and the
years of observations are 1982 to 1996 for the observations of brain drain and 1989 to
2004 for the observations of FDI.
During these period each year roughly 25,000 Canadians decided to migrate an settle
in the United States. 8,000 to 10,000 of those are university graduates, hence can be
considered as brain - drain.
Concerning the measurement of foreign direct investments, in my analysis I focus on
the sector of services. I do so because of two reasons: First, this sector is particularly
technology intense hence, any investment implies high marginal returns to technological
improvement. Second, the investments in services are less time consuming than in
other sectors - they require less preparation are less subject to other constraints (such
as natural resources or infrastructure). According to recent studies on technological13
transfer4 the e⁄ect of foreign FDI on international ￿ ow of technologies is the strongest in
the sector of services. The policy advise for the lagging countries that follows from these
studies is to facilitate the incoming FDI in services from the technologically advanced
countries. This is one of the fastest and the easiest methods for transfer of the state-of-
the-art technologies.
In the analyzed period on average two thirds of total of foreign direct investments to
Canada were from the United States. US investments were growing over that period
from 13% of Canadian GDP in 1989 to 19% in 2004. The investments in Canadian
sector of services gained on average 10% of total FDI in￿ ows.
In order to check whether there is any causality of migration of skilled agents from
Canada to the US and American investments in Canadian sector of services I perform
Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis is in this case that brain drain from Canada
to the US does not cause the FDI ￿ ows in the sector of services from US to Canada.
The ￿rst test considers the Canadian professionals with tertiary education that decided
to settle in the United States. The null hypothesis, that a ￿ ow of such professionals
does not cause the in￿ ow of US FDI to Canadian services. The F-statistic from the test
is 0.355 which correspond to the con￿dence level of 0.71. Thus, the null hypothesis is
rejected.
The second step I perform is to re￿ne the previous tests by concentrating only on a
given group of professionals. I wish to check, whether any group of professionals that
potentially is being employed in services has a particularly strong e⁄ect on American
investments in Canada. Given the data available, in the re￿ned test I decide to use I
consider Canadian managers that decided to migrate to the United States. The null
hypothesis is that migration of Canadian managers to the United States does not cause
￿ ows of US FDI to Canadian services. The F-Statistic of such test equals to 0.242 which
corresponds to the 0.79 con￿dence level. Again this hypothesis is rejected
The results of both tests are that the migration of Canadian professionals to the United
States causes US investments to Canadian sector of services. Particularly the migration
of Canadian managers has a strong causal e⁄ect on the US FDI. Therefore one can
conclude that in this case the brain drain triggers the investments from the migrants￿
destination country.
4see:
OECD, September 2005, Policy Brief: Opening Up Trade in Services: Crucial for Economic Growth
OECD, 2005, Enhancing the Performance of the Services Sector and
OECD, 2004, Services Trade Liberalisation: Identifying Opportunities and Gains14
4 Conclusion
The present paper shows that:
￿ The migration of high-skilled agents to the R&D sector is bene￿cial for the desti-
nation country in the long - run. As the research technology depends on positive
externalities created by the stock of human capital, the brain drain increases the
growth rate of technological progress.
￿ The total e⁄ect of the brain drain on the source economy is ambiguous. As the
skilled workers can be essential for the adoption of foreign technologies, the brain
drain can cause the slowdown of the technological progress of the sending country.
Nevertheless, the emigration of high- skilled agents triggers the capital ￿ ows, which
result in direct transmission of technologies.
The bene￿cial e⁄ect of brain drain on the destination economy is unambiguous. The
empirical evidence, that the immigrants to the developed countries are mostly well
educated supports the theoretical predictions.
While the theoretical conclusions about the e⁄ects of brain drain on the destination
countries are clear, the e⁄ects on the source countries depend on two opposite e⁄ects.
Numerous examples suggest that there is little di⁄erence in the performance of neighbor-
ing countries, which di⁄er with respect to the rate of brain drain but are similar with
respect to other factors. Recall once again the study of Carrington and Detragiache
(1998). According to their results among South American countries Guyana ￿ su⁄ers￿
from a huge rate of brain drain. Almost 80% of Guyanese graduates decide for emi-
gration (mostly to the United States), while this ratio in the neighboring Venezuela or
Ecuador does not reach even the level of 3%5. Nevertheless, such tremendous di⁄erence
in the rates of migration of skilled labour does not create any signi￿cant di⁄erence in
the economic performance of both countries neither in the GDP per capita nor in the
rate of growth. Even more striking example can be observed in Asia, where the source
country - South Korea with the emigration rate of 6% in its tertiary educational group
preforms much better than Thailand where this ratio amounts around 1%.
This evidence suggests that the key element for the economic performance are other
factors related to the structure of the economy rather than the brain drain itself. These
factors that prevent capital mobility, technological adoption and capital accumulation
tend to be crucial in understanding the di⁄erences in income between the countries.
5Data for 199015
A possible policy prescription is therefore, to create an environment, which promotes
the adoption of the foreign solutions / technologies that improve the local productivity
instead of searching for an alternative options. Indeed, the relation between the rate
of brain drain and the volume of foreign direct investments is positive in the sending
areas whereas the relation between the rate of brain drain and the GDP / growth rate
of GDP is rather unclear.
To conclude. The phenomenon of brain drain seems to have a positive impact on the
performance of the developed countries. Its e⁄ect on the developing economies is am-
biguous and it seems to have little e⁄ect on the welfare of the sending countries.
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